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ABSTRACT 
 
How does population dynamics influence outcomes in situations with public good 
characteristics? The present paper answers this question by analysing the evolution of costly 
cooperation in a multi-group population. Building on insights first developed in modern 
biology the idea of viscous population equilibria is introduced (a population is said to be 
viscous when a (sub)population of players is spatially or genetically clustered). A simple 
model then analyses how the combined effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and 
different levels of between-group segregation influences the evolution of cooperation. The 
results suggest that a key issue in the evolution of cooperation is the shifting balance between 
the need to protect cooperators and propagation of the tendency to cooperate.  
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Thus every part was full of vice, 
Yet the whole mass a paradise...  
(Mandeville, 1705: The Grumbling Hive, or Knaves Turned Honest) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The interaction between cooperators and defectors is often modelled in terms of the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma (PD henceforth) where two players each have two possible strategies: 
defect or cooperate. In face of the negative fate of cooperators implied by non-cooperative 
game theory and epitomised in the famous PD-game, there is an obvious difficulty in 
sustaining the argument of persistent costly cooperative behaviour2. Nevertheless, examples 
of costly cooperative behaviour are replete both in biological (see e.g. Hamilton, 1975; 
Cronin, 1991) and social populations (see e.g. Becker, 1996, Elster, 1989; Hechter, 1988; 
Hodgson, 1994).3  
 Hamilton (1964) demonstrated that cooperation could be sustained in viscous 
populations, i.e., when close relatives are more likely to interact than they are with distant 
ones, e.g. due to the formation of local herds and colonies. This analysis was extended in 
Hamilton (1975) and recently supplemented by research on geographical dispersal (see e.g. 
Nakamura & Iwasa, 1998). Since most of these studies consider single populations, it would 
be interesting to see how the interaction of multiple clustered populations influences the 
evolution of team play.  
 In the ensuing, I address this problem in a model where each of a number of finite 
interacting subgroups is populated by members of which a proportion is cooperators and the 
rest are defectors. A member of a subgroup meets another subgroup member and receives the 
PD pay-off in terms of an expected number of offspring4. The PD pay-off is thus a measure 
of fitness in a biological model. In a model relevant for the social realm, the PD pay-off may 
                                                 
2
 The terms “team play,” “altruism” and “cooperation” are used synonymously to denote cooperative behaviour, 
which at a real cost to its provider adds a greater benefit to the group.
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 At least four somewhat different explanations why costly cooperation can be sustained in situations with PD 
characteristics have been proposed (Becker, 1976, 1996; Eshel et al., 1998; , Elster, 1989; Myerson et al., 1991; 
Sella & Lachmann, 2000). 
 
4
 The model, therefore, is different from the multi-population models described by Weibull (1995) where 
members from one subpopulation can interact directly with members from other subpopulations. 
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denote the number of students educated by a specific university (department) or the number 
of new team members trained by a specific team (in a private company as well as in a state 
institution such as the U.S. Navy Seals).  
 The purpose of the present paper is to analyse a population of multiple interacting 
subgroups in which each subgroup is more or less clustered. Thus, in addition to the 
described within-group interaction and death, there is migration between groups. Migration is 
modelled as a tendency that the difference in population mixture between segregated 
subgroups will vanish. This type of dynamics seems to have a number of close parallels both 
in the biological and the social realm. One example of such structural dynamics is associated 
with the interaction within and between departments in private corporations, universities and 
military organisations. Another relates to the interaction within and between strategic groups 
of private corporations and yet another to the interaction within and between nation states. 
Extending the analysis of viscosity from single- to multi-group populations, the 
present work is closely related to Hamilton (1964, 1975) and Myerson et al. (1991). Also, the 
multilevel problem mentioned in Sober & Wilson (1998) is given consideration. Other related 
work is Amann & Yang (1998), Becker (1976), Bergstrom & Stark (1993), DeCanio and 
Watkins (1998) and Eshel et al. (1998). The paper is organised as follows. First, the concept 
of viscosity is related to the evolution of cooperation in structured biological and social 
populations. Then, a simple model illustrates how the combined effect of viscosity within 
multiple subgroups and different levels of segregation between the subgroups influence the 
evolution of cooperation. Some implications for theories of innovation are discussed 
followed by the conclusion. 
 
 
STRUCTURED POPULATIONS AND VISCOUS POPULATION EQUILIBRIA 
In the following, I consider the dynamics of population structure on two levels: within 
and between multiple subgroups. That is, in addition to within-group dynamics, I consider 
different levels of segregation between subgroups. 
  At this point, it is useful to provide the definition of viscosity used to model clustering 
within subgroups of a population. Thus, in accordance with Hamilton (1964, 1975), a viscous 
population is one where there is spatial or genetic clustering. More precisely, the degree of 
clustering can be defined in terms of a viscosity parameter d  referring to the probability of 
interacting with a neighbour who plays a similar strategy. For a cooperator this implies that 
the probability of interaction is the sum of the probabilities of two forms of interaction: (1) 
the probability of interacting with random strangers (cooperators or defectors), and (2) the 
probability of interacting with players that are definitely cooperators. An equivalent 
definition applies to defectors. When an interaction is of the first type, I shall refer to it as 
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“random.” The second type of interaction is referred to as, ”non-random.” When the 
interaction is random, the individual meets cooperators and defectors with a probability in 
proportion to their population mixture. When the interaction is non-random, the individual 
definitely meets its own strategy (including the interaction of the individual with itself). Thus 
for cooperators, the probability of meeting cooperators (including self) within subgroup i is 
defined as: 
 
(1) P(Ci , Ci) = d i + (1- d i) C*i,  
 
where C*i = Ci/ (Di+ Ci) is the proportion of cooperators in subgroup i, d i is the viscosity 
parameter specific to subgroup i and P(Ci , Di)=1 - P(Ci , Ci) 5. As the viscosity parameter d i 
increases, the subgroup is increasingly clustered or viscous, and, the probability that a 
cooperator meets a cooperator increases for a given mixture of cooperators and defectors.  
A different way to look at this is that N samples were obtained from subgroup i by a 
random split-half procedure and then correlated. If N is arbitrarily large, the viscosity 
parameter d i is an expression of the correlation as measured by the correlation coefficient. In 
biological models, a positive correlation coefficient is often referred to as positive assortment. 
The viscosity parameter d i, therefore, provides a convenient compact representation of a 
statistical relationship between members of any population whatever its source (spatial 
structure or genetic relatedness). Therefore, whatever its source, I shall refer to a subgroup as 
being viscous if d i >0, meaning that there is a statistical relationship between subgroup 
members that deviates from the expectation under a random distribution of subgroup 
members. 
In addition to the viscosity parameter that regulates the interaction of cooperators and 
defectors within each subgroup, I define an equivalent population parameter, g , that regulates 
between-group segregation. The frequency Fic of cooperators in subgroup i is defined as: 
 
(2) Fic = Ci/ (Ci + Di.. 
 
The frequency of cooperators in each of the j neighbouring subgroups after migration is 
defined as6: 
                                                 
ˆ
 The probability of a (Di, Di) meeting is P(Di , Di) = d i + (1-d i) D*i, where D*i is the proportion of defectors in 
subgroup i and the probability of a (Di, Ci) meeting is P(Di, Ci) = 1- P(Di , Di). 
6 The frequency of migrating cooperators from subgroup i is (Fic - Z)/ Fic: if the sign is positive, cooperators 
leave subgroup i, and if the sign is negative cooperators arrive to subgroup i.  
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(3) Fic’= Z - g  (Z - Ci*), 
 Z= 1/j S (Ci/ (Ci + Di.))= 1/j S Fic  
 
where 
g
 is the segregation parameter bounded between 0 and 1. All L subgroups live on a 
one-dimensional lattice folded into a ring and the summation is taken over j< L adjacent 
subgroups. Starting from subgroup 1 (randomly assigned), there is migration between the 
subgroups 1, 2, ..., j in time step 1, between 2, 3, ...,  j+1 in time step 2, and so on (since the 
lattice is folded into a ring, there is no boundary problem). Ci* is the proportion of 
cooperators in each of the subgroups i= 1, 2, ... L. Note that 
g
= 1 is an expression of complete 
segregation between subgroups and 
g
= 0 is the situation with no segregation between 
subgroups. As can be seen by comparison, 
g
 is the population level equivalent of the within-
group viscosity parameter 
d i7.  
 
Viscosity and the evolution of cooperation in biological populations 
In biology, the evolution of cooperation is associated with two distinct ideas: (1) a 
gene-centred view which dissolves a conflict between the gene and its carrier, and (2) viscous 
populations in terms of genetic relatedness (referred to as positive assortment by the 
biologist) or spatial clustering (referred to as viscosity by the biologist). Much has been said 
about the first point (e.g. Dawkins, 1976 and Cronin’s 1991). Apparent altruism on part of a 
gene-carrying individual is sometimes a clever strategy favouring the gene’s multiplication. 
What perhaps needs more emphasis in this story is that the potential immortality of genes 
opens the possibility of infinitely repeated games and thus altruism on part of the gene. 
Therefore, the universal selfishness of genes promoted by Dawkins (1976) may be an 
overstatement. We shall leave this matter here and in the ensuing focus on the second point, 
viscous populations where the expression of genetic relatedness or spatial clustering explains 
the persistence of cooperation. 
The evolution of cooperation in biological populations has been associated with the 
clustering of organisms in geographical space. The original formulation was due to Hamilton 
(1964): 
 
With many natural populations it must happen that an individual forms the centre of 
an actual local concentration of his relatives, which is due to a general inability, or 
disinclination of the organisms to move far from their places of birth. (Hamilton, 
1964: p.10). 
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Hamilton (1964) further developed a model, which distinguished between two effects: 
a diluting effect and an inclusive fitness effect. Inclusive fitness was defined as a measure of 
the total effect of an organism’s behaviour upon all genes identical by descent whereas the 
diluting effect measured the total effect on other organisms. The sum of the two, then, 
accounts for the total effects on reproduction due to a particular organism. Whereas the 
diluting effect was shown to influence the level of altruism, the inclusive fitness effect was 
shown to be more fundamental, determining the direction and progress in frequencies of 
altruistic genes. Crucially, the possibility that altruism may evolve by natural selection was 
shown to depend upon inclusive fitness. A vivid illustration of the idea, provided by 
Hamilton (and before him Haldane) is that we should expect that no one is prepared to 
sacrifice his life for any single person but that everyone will sacrifice it when he can thereby 
save more than two sisters, four half-sisters, or eight first cousins etc8. Moreover, in 
comparison to the classical model, where advantages are conferred directly by a gene to its 
carrier, another gene, which conferred similar advantages to its sibs, would progress at 
exactly half the rate. In other words, the more indirect the transfer of reproductive potential, 
the slower the rate of evolutionary progress. This point indicates a general trade-off between 
probabilistic dilution and the speed of progress, or, in different terms, the need to balance 
protection and propagation of cooperation depending on the rate at which cooperation is 
”produced” within each subgroup.  
Considering the case of multiple subgroups, Hamilton (1975) used the Price (1970; 
1972) equations to further clarify how between-group selection favouring altruistic traits, to 
some extent, but never completely, may slow down within-group selection favouring 
selfishness. Briefly, the higher the between-group differences, the more important is between-
group selection compared to within-group selection, however, within-group selection is 
always stronger. Unless a mechanism can be devised that continuously supplies new 
between-group variance, altruism cannot prosper9. Two extreme models of multiple 
subgroups are analysed by Hamilton (1975). The first assumes persistent groups with no 
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 Since, on average, a human being shares 50% of its genes with its sisters, 25% with half-sisters etc.
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 Sober & Wilson (1998) discusses the implications of the Price equations for altruism to evolve. On the basis of 
Hamilton’s (1975) model, Sober & Wilson (1998) conclude that “[t]he significance of genetic relatedness for 
the evolution of altruism is that it increases genetic variation among groups, thereby increasing the importance 
of group selection.” This seems to miss the point that it is the non-random component in gene donation 
introduced by Hamilton’s (1975) assortment procedure, not group selection per se, which allows cooperation to 
prosper. As further demonstrated in the ensuing, Hamilton’s (1975) assortment procedure can be respecified to 
work in a population, which is not divided into subgroups or demes.
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extinction and no between-group variation. Since, in this model, between-group variance is 
reduced as the best group increasingly dominates, altruism cannot evolve10. The analysis of a 
model at the opposite extreme in which groups break up completely and re-form in each 
generation leads to the same conclusion, altruism cannot evolve. However, slightly changing 
the assortment procedure so the correlation in two samples of randomly selected members of 
a group is F can make the model work. Hamilton (1975) assumes this is achieved by having a 
fraction F of groups made pure for each type and the remainder formed randomly. Then, if 
the altruist gives up k units of fitness to add K units to joint fitness, it is relatively 
straightforward to show that the criterion for positive selection of altruism is (Hamilton, 
1975): 
 
(4) K/k > 1/F 
 
As Hamilton (1975) further notes, this criterion is completely general for asexual models 
with non-overlapping generations, and also holds for diploid biological models. In other 
words, it is general to both social and biological populations. Moreover, Hamilton (1975) 
provides the following useful general definition of F later adopted by Myerson et al. (1991) 
in terms of the viscosity parameter ( d ): 
 
...the existence of the positive correlation F could be interpreted as implying in this 
case that there is a chance F that the K units of fitness are definitely given to a fellow 
altruist, while with chance (1-F) they are given (as they always were) to a random 
member of the population. 
 
Three general conclusions flow from Hamilton’s (1975) model. The first is that between-
group segregation is important in determining the level which altruism can reach, a point also 
emphasised by Eshel (1972). Second, altruism can evolve if the population is genetically 
related or spatially clustered so the viscosity parameter F (= d ) >0. Third, the population 
dynamics introduced by migration may be a source of spatial clustering but mere segregation 
between multiple subgroups is not enough to substitute for viscosity within the individual 
subgroups11. Segregation between subgroups clearly helps sustain cooperation but without 
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 According to Hamilton (1975), this refutes Haldane’s (1932) model as the first successful analytical model for 
altruism.
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 An exception includes the situation where the pay-off to a defector meeting another defector <1 provided 
there is sufficient initial differences in the size of sub-populations (see Sella & Lachman, 2000).  
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the presence of viscosity at the subgroup level, cooperators will eventually wither away. Thus 
viscosity within subgroups (and not different levels of segregation between subgroups) may 
lead to the co-existence of cooperative and defective strategies in a biological population. The 
mechanism that accounts for this result is the spatial clustering or genetic relatedness, which 
gives rise to uneven dispersal of strategies within a subgroup. When strategies are unevenly 
distributed, the probability of meeting a relative programmed with a similar strategy may be 
sufficiently high to ensure that the cooperative strategy will be fixed in the population. This 
would be the case when local herds or colonies build up as in the examples of the social 
insects provided by Hamilton (1964, 1975)12. 
 
Viscosity and the evolution of cooperation in social populations 
Since deterministic biological models are not obviously relevant in the social realm, it 
is important to identify conditions that justify their application. As aforementioned, we often 
encounter structured social populations, such as evolutionary cells and strategic groups 
within interacting industries. Although the underlying source of the prevailing population 
structure  in terms of persistent subgroup heterogeneity may differ from case to case, it is 
important to emphasise that the population structure needs to be persistent. Therefore, a 
general source of between-group segregation in social populations is the opportunity costs 
involved in changing membership from one subgroup to the next. As the opportunity costs of 
moving between subgroups approach zero, nothing prevents the differences between 
subgroups to vanish. A number of sources for opportunity costs associated with membership 
of social populations such as sentiment, club membership and industrial entry barriers can be 
envisioned. But what are the sources of within-group viscosity in social populations?  
Viscosity refers to the tendency for agents with a stable predisposition towards a certain type 
of behaviour to cluster in geographical space or in gene-space. In a previous paper (Knudsen 
& Foss, 1999) it was argued that behavioural programmes, specifically the tendency to 
cooperate or defect, could be viewed as a semi-stable trait acquired in a particular subgroup, 
i.e., a production team in a business organisation. As pointed out by, among others, March & 
Simon (1958), Nelson & Winter (1982) and Langlois (1995), the role of behavioural 
programmes and routines is not just the storing of production knowledge, but also the storing 
of behavioural knowledge. If it is further accepted that behavioural programmes and routines 
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 More recently, Kawata (1998), in a simulation study of sexual reproduction, assumed altruistic behaviour on 
the part of females only and found that altruism could evolve when male and female dispersal differs. Nakamura 
et al.’s (1998) study of lattice models where the relatively nice strategy tit-for-tat can invade a population 
dominated by defectors only in a viscous population supports Kawata’s (1998) results. Also related to the 
present work is Van Baalen & Rand’s (1998) study where the coefficient of relatedness depends on local 
population dynamics. Van Baalen & Rand (1998) find that the likelihood of defector invasion in cooperative 
populations depends on the cluster dynamic, which underlies local population growth. 
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involve a tacit component acquired in time-consuming face-to-face interaction, particular 
behavioural traits will not only tend to be relatively stable, they will also spread slowly in a 
larger subgroup. Therefore, in larger subgroups close neighbours should be more likely to 
share behavioural dispositions than distant neighbours. Thus we have arrived at a social 
equivalent of viscosity, i.e., clustering in social space. 
Professionalization is obviously an example of a possible source of stable social 
stereotypes acquired by face-to-face interaction during long periods of training (see e.g. Van 
Maanen, 1973). Surely, such stereotypes spread relatively slowly and unevenly in the social 
landscape. As described by Nelson & Winter (1982), training in business organisations plays 
a similar role. According to Nelson & Winter (1982), new organisation members acquire the 
routines that carry the firm’s productive knowledge through face-to-face interactions. The 
reason that face-to-face interaction is necessary is that knowledge is sticky, routines contain a 
tacit component that can only be acquired through an emulation procedure involving learning 
by doing with other team members (Knudsen, 2001).  
A further source of viscosity in social populations, originally pointed out by Hamilton 
(1964), is provided by discrimination, i.e., when norms dictate that frequent social interaction 
with some is more appropriate than with others.  
Having provided equivalents to within-group viscosity and between-group 
segregation in social populations, I next turn to a model that illustrates how their combined 
effect influences the evolution of cooperation. In order to strip the analysis down to 
essentials, I shall not consider reciprocity, i.e., strategies relying on discrimination and 
memory are ignored. If cooperation can evolve in a model without reciprocity, surely, the 
introduction of reciprocity will allow cooperation to prosper in yet a number of additional 
situations.  
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The evolution of cooperation in isolated or single groups 
Before presenting the case of multiple subgroups, I first turn to Myerson et al.’s 
(1991) useful extension of Hamilton’s (1964, 1975) insights. Myerson et al. (1991) define a 
viscosity parameter ( d ), a viscous population equilibrium and, taking the limit as viscosity 
goes to zero, they define a fluid population equilibrium. In the present article the analyses are 
limited to non-cooperative games and use the PD pay-offs shown below in Table 1a. 
Furthermore, I refer to Myerson et al. (1991) for the generalisation that at least one viscous 
equilibrium exists in a finite strategy set.  
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 For a moment, consider a one-shot PD-game where pay-offs are utilities (or profits). 
Let strategy C meet its kin with probability P(Ci , Ci) = d i + (1- d i) Ci* and its opponent D with 
probability P(Ci , Di) = 1 - P(Ci , Ci) as previously defined (equation 1 and footnote 9). 
Likewise, D meets D with probability P(Di , Di) = d i + (1- d i) Di* and its opponent C with 
probability P(Di, Ci) = 1 - P(Di , Di)13. In this case, the expected value of the pay-off 
associated with a cooperator’s (defector’s) strategy profile s is: 
 
(5a) uC(s) =  3 P(Ci , Ci) + 0 P(Ci , Di)  
  =  3 ( d i + (1 - d i) C*i)  
  =  3 C*i + 3 d i D*i 
 
(5b) uD(s) =  5 P(Di , Ci) + 1 P(Di , Di) 
  =  5 (1- d i-D*i+ d i D*i) + ( d i + (1 - d i)D*i) 
  =  C*i (5- 4 d i) + D*i 
 
 Table 1b below shows the relevant adjusted PD pay-offs where C is the strategy 
cooperate and D is the strategy defect14. Note that the expected value of the pay-offs uC(s) 
and uD(s) can be read off directly from Table 1b if we, for a moment, interpret the population 
states C*i and D*i as the components of a mixed strategy15. Note that the normalised adjusted 
pay-offs, which are used in the analysis of the replicator dynamics in later sections of the 
paper, are derived from the pay-offs in Table 1b and are for reasons of convenient 
comparison shown here in Table 1c. 
 
---------------------------- 
Table 1 a,b,c about here 
---------------------------- 
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 The probabilities P(Ci , Ci) and P(Di , Di) provide a complete description of the interaction between players. 
 
14
 The pay-offs in 1b can be obtained directly from the matrix A =(3,0;5,1) shown in 1a, i.e., by adding (1- d )A 
and d A’ where A’ =(3,3;1,1).  
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  We can do this since a population state is formally identical with a mixed strategy (Weibull, 1995). 
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 From the adjusted pay-off matrix shown in Table 1b, it is straightforward to see that 
cooperation can only evolve when the probability of meeting a fellow cooperator is at least 
1/2, i.e., when 1/2 £  d i, the unique viscous equilibrium is C and everybody receives pay-off 3. 
When  d i  1/3, the unique viscous equilibrium is D, and when 1/3< d i <1/2, the unique 
equilibrium is mixed. The thrust of the example, is that cooperation can evolve in a single 
subgroup if the viscosity parameter d i is sufficiently high, i.e., if spatial or genetic clustering 
is sufficiently high. One limit of the example, however, is that fitness is suppressed. What 
would happen if we interpreted the pay-offs as an expression of the individual’s fitness in 
terms of the number of offspring produced per time unit? 
 In the remainder of the paper, the game is thought of as a meeting between two 
individuals programmed to play the pure strategy C or D. The individuals live in subgroup i 
and the state of the subgroup is defined as the vector whose components C*i and D*i are the 
shares of subgroup i programmed to play C and D, respectively. Within each subgroup, the 
players meet in pairs according to the probabilities P(Ci , Ci), and P(Di , Di)  as previously 
defined. 
  Assuming a population with non-overlapping generations, we can use Hamilton’s 
(1975) general criterion for altruism to evolve, i.e., K/k > 1/F as explained in the above. The 
question is, what values of the viscosity parameter d i (F in Hamilton’s model), can sustain 
cooperation when the opportunity cost to the altruist is k and the benefit added to the group is 
K?  
 With the above pay-offs, and assuming a population where all defect, k= 1 and K= 3 
so cooperation can evolve when F> k/K= 1/3.16 As indicated by this calculation, some level of 
cooperation will prosper for 1/3< d i < 1/2 in models of non-overlapping generations where 
fitness is expressed, i.e., in growth models where pay-offs denote differential increases (or 
decreases) in the actual number of particular types of agents17. Even if this result can be 
obtained directly from an inspection of the eigenvalues associated with the replicator 
dynamics, as shown in the following section, it provides a useful connection to Hamilton’s 
original model. 
  The result that cooperation can evolve when F (= d i) > 1/3 demonstrates that 
Hamilton’s  (1975: p. 140) assortment procedure can be respecified to work in a population 
that is not divided into subgroups or demes. Consequently, Sober & Wilson’s (1998: p. 76-7) 
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 The joint benefit K to the group is calculated by inclusion of the altruists pay-offs.
 
17
 An economic model where fitness is expressed would imply that the appropriate criterion of success is actual 
asset accumulation. Profits in such models, in contrast to most models analysed in evolutionary economics, must 
be seen as a medium which translates into asset accumulation.
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claim that the significance of relatedness for the evolution of altruism is to increase genetic 
variation among subgroups and thereby increasing the importance of group selection needs 
further qualification. The general cause of altruism in Hamilton’s (1975) model is viscosity 
and although viscosity may be produced by an assortment procedure involving multiple 
subgroups, as specified by Hamilton (1975), this is not really necessary. 
 However, this clarification points to a further limit of the above example. What would 
happen if we allowed for differences in viscosity in a population of multiple subgroups? In 
particular, it would be interesting to see how the combined effect of viscosity within 
subgroups, and, the level of segregation between subgroups, influences the range of feasible 
equilibria, an issue not addressed by Myerson et al. (1991). To shed light on this problem, the 
ensuing sections study how viscosity within and segregation between multiple subgroups 
influence the range of stable states where a proportion of cooperators is sustained.  
 
Evolution with Viscosity Within and Segregation Between Multiple Subgroups 
 This section describes a simple model of evolution in a multi-group population. The 
model illustrates how different levels of within-group viscosity and between-group 
segregation influences survival of cooperation. To simplify matters, we use the above PD 
pay-offs and note that conclusions will not change qualitatively as long as this pay-off 
structure is unaltered.  
 
Interactions between individuals within subgroups. Assume a finite subgroup i of Ni players 
programmed to play C and D in the proportions Ci*, Di*. In each time unit t, all agents within 
subgroup i meet in pairs according to the probabilities P(Ci , Ci), and P(Di , Di) as previously 
defined. As a result of the meeting, a C and D player will receive the number offspring 
specified by the pay-offs in Table 1.  
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Analysis of one subgroup. Before the multi-group model is presented, it is useful to analyse 
the replicator dynamics in the case of a single subgroup (identical to the case of complete 
segregation). The replicator dynamics provides an expression for the growth rate of the 
population share Ci* (Di*) in terms of the difference between the number of offspring (pay-
off) currently obtained by C-players and the current average pay-off (Weibull, 1995). The 
replicator dynamics, is therefore a convenient basis for computing the steady states of the 
within-group dynamics in the case of a single subgroup. Since the growth rate is independent 
of the background birth- and death rates in the case of a single subgroup (Weibull, 1995), I 
first introduce death when the multi-group model is analysed. It should also be noted that 
although there exists a multi-group version of the replicator dynamics (see e.g. Hofbauer & 
Sigmund, 1998; Weibull, 1995), it is not readily tailored to the purpose of the present multi-
group study.  
 Using the normalised adjusted pay-offs shown in Table 1c, the replicator dynamics 
for a single completely segregated subgroup can be defined as (Weibull, 1995): 
 
(6a) dCi*/dt = [(4 d i-2)Ci* + (1-3 d i)Di*] Ci* Di* 
(6b) dDi*/dt = -dCi*/dt 
 
 For a single subgroup, when d i £  1/3, the normalised adjusted payoffs have opposing 
signs (4 d i-2 < 0 and 0 £  1-3 d i), which means that starting from any interior initial position in 
the simplex defined by the population shares (Ci*, Di*), the population state always 
converges to defection (Di*Æ1) as the ESS. When 1/2 £  d i, the normalised adjusted payoffs 
also have opposing signs (0 £  4 d i-2 and 1-3 d i,< 0) which, in this case, means that starting 
from any interior initial position (Ci*, Di*), the population state always converges to 
cooperation (Ci*Æ1) as the ESS (Weibull, 1995). This result can also be obtained by solving 
for dCi*/dt =0 and dDi*/dt =0. When 1/3 < d i < 1/2, then every value of d i defines a unique 
proportion (Ci*, Di*) as the ESS. Thus, in the range 1/3 < d i < 1/2, there are infinitely many 
population states, which are ESS (given d i is defined as continuous). By definition, to be an 
ESS, every strategy X must fulfil two conditions (Weibull, 1995): 
 
(7a) u(Y, X) £   u(X, X) and 
(7b) u(Y, X)= u(X, X) => u(Y, Y) < u(X, Y), for all Y „  X 
 
 Since any candidate ESS, X is in the interior of the simplex defined by the population 
shares (Ci*, Di*), for 1/3 < d i < 1/2 every strategy Y is a best reply to X. Therefore, the 
second condition requires u(X-Y, Y) > 0 for all Y „  X (Weibull, 1995). Using the pay-offs 
shown in Table 1b, we compute u(X-Y, Y)= (X1 – Y1) ( d i (3+ Y1)– Y1 –1). Setting X1= 0 and 
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Y1= 1 => u(X-Y, Y) > 0 for d i< 1/2. Setting X1= 1 and Y1= 0 => u(X-Y, Y) > 0 for 1/3< d i. 
Thus for every d i  in the range 1/3 < d i < 1/2, there is a unique mixed strategy X which is ESS. 
That is, as d i  increases from 1/3 to 1/2, the proportion of cooperators increases from 0 to 1 
and each d i  defines a unique proportion of Ci* (Di*) as an ESS and steady state of the 
replicator dynamics.  
 In sum, for the single subgroup, the steady states of the replicator dynamics, which 
are also ESS are: (1) Di* Æ 1 for d i £  1/3, (2) Ci* Æ 1 for 1/2 £  d i , and (3) a unique 
proportion of 0< Ci* and 0< Di* for 1/3 < d i < 1/2, (Ci* + Di*= 1). Another way to see this is 
to note that both eigenvalues in the replicator dynamics are negative when 1/3 < d i < 1/2 and 
they have opposite signs outside this range. 
 
Analysis of multiple subgroups. I now proceed to illustrate how between-group dynamics (0 £  
g  <1) alter the values of Ci* and Di* when d i  is allowed to vary across subgroups. I use a 
simulation model since it is not straightforward to obtain an analytic solution for n subgroups 
when there are differences across more than two subgroups in d i  and g < 118. 
 A model of 20 subgroups i of size Ni with NiC cooperators and NiD defectors is 
studied. The results are independent of the value of Ni, which is set to 50. The expected value 
of the pay offs to the Ni agents in each subgroup are according to adjusted pay offs shown in 
Table 1b: 
 
(8a) NiC uC(s) =  NiC [3 C*i + 3 d i D*i] 
(8b) NiD uD(s) =  NiC [C*i (5- 4d i) + D*i] 
 
Between-group segregation. As previously defined, g  regulates between-group segregation. 
In the present model there are L=20 subgroups and there is migration between j=4 
neighbouring subgroups at each time step.19 The probability that cooperators will migrate 
between the 4 neighbouring subgroups i and j was previously defined in equation (2). 
 
Death. After each period, the Ci and Di strategists are reduced with a factor y . y  is 2 with 
certainty plus a random component drawn from a uniform distribution [0,2], so E(y )=3.  
                                                 
18
 Weibull (1997) considers alternative approaches to multipopulation replicator dynamics (e.g. Taylor, 1979; 
Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988) without viscosity. In the present work, we study different levels in viscosity among 
a number of non-fixed populations.  
 
19 If the condition j <L is fullfilled, the obtained results are not sensitive to the particular number L of 
subgroups analysed or the particular number j < L of subgroups among which there is migration in each time 
step. 
  
15 
 
The Combined Influence of Within-Group Viscosity and Between-Group Segregation 
 This section presents the results of the analysis of the model described in the above. 
Two  configurations with initial maximum differences in subgroup composition were 
analysed.  
 In the first configuration, all 20 subgroups were identical and completely mixed in 
period one, i.e., 50% cooperators and 50% defectors. In the second configuration, 10 
subgroups were populated entirely by cooperators and the remaining 10 subgroups were 
populated entirely by defectors. Apart from the extreme situation where all subgroups were 
completely segregated (g =1), the equilibrium proportions of cooperators converged in the two 
configurations. Averaging 100 runs of the model, 50 for each configuration obtained the 
results reported in the ensuing. Each run encompassed 150 periods since stability was usually 
obtained in less than 100 periods. The analyses cover the following topics: (1) the evolution 
of cooperation in completely segregated subgroups (g =1), (2) the evolution of cooperation 
when there is no segregation between subgroups ( g =0), (3) the evolution of cooperation when 
there is some segregation between subgroups (0< g < 1), (4) the evolution of cooperation for 
low and high average subgroup viscosity d  = 1/20 S d i when there is some segregation 
between subgroups (0< g < 1), and (5) the sensitivity to initial conditions. 
 
The evolution of cooperation in completely segregated subgroups. The subgroups are 
completely segregated when there is no migration between neighbouring subgroups. The 
evolution of cooperation in completely segregated subgroups (g =1) is identical to the 
evolution of cooperation in a single subgroup covered in the above analysis. Thus, stable 
proportions of both Ci* and Di* are sustained for 1/3< d i <1/2. For d i= 3/7, 50% of the 
subgroup are cooperators. Unless, subgroups are initially pure (Ci*= 1), it is impossible to 
sustain cooperation for any d i< 1/3. That is, the population viscosity average d  for the 20 
subgroups needs to be larger than 1/3 for cooperation to survive. How does the level of 
segregation between groups change this fact? 
 
The evolution of cooperation when there is complete migration between subgroups. As g  Æ 
0, migration between neighbouring subgroups increases and it becomes increasingly difficult 
to sustain cooperation. When g =0, the cooperators in subgroup i can only survive when all 
1/3< d iimplying an average 1/3< d . Some degree of segregation between subgroups (0< g < 
1), however, introduces a delay that allows cooperation to be sustained for very low average 
d ’s (in the present study d > 0.05).  
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The evolution of cooperation when there is some segregation between subgroups. In the case 
where d i  has the same value in all subgroups (d i = d  for all i), increasing the segregation 
between subgroups (g  Æ 1) does not help to sustain cooperation. For ( d i =) d  < 1/3, 
cooperation cannot be sustained even when g  = 0.99. For 1/3< ( d i =) d  <1/2, the stable 
proportion of cooperators is identical to the case of completely isolated subgroups but as the 
level of segregation increases, the number of periods to reach the steady state also increases. 
For ( d i =) d  =1/2, (and slightly above 1/2), however, segregation does make a difference. For 
very high levels of g , cooperation will drive out defection. As segregation decreases, 
however, a small proportion of defectors can survive. Since the reduction of group size 
(death) after each period includes a stochastic component, the defectors’ survival point, 
defined by d , increases slightly (from 0.50 to 0.54).  
 
---------------------------- 
Figure 1 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
 Figure 1 shows the case where d  =1/2. As shown in Figure 1, if g = 0.99, the 
population consists only of cooperators (C*= 1) when d i = d  =1/2. In the ensuing, the fitness 
landscape in Figure 1 is explained in more detail20. 
 
The evolution of cooperation when subgroup viscosity differs. Introducing differences in 
viscosity ( d i ) across subgroups for a given average d  changes matters. For a given level of the 
population average d , maximum differences in subgroup d i’s are analysed. Maximum 
differences are obtained when some subgroups are set to a given value of d i and d i =0 for the 
remaining subgroups. When d i = 0 for the remaining subgroups, a population average d = 0.50 
can, for example, be obtained by the following values of d i, 0.50 in all 20 subgroups, 0.60 in 
16 subgroups and 0.40 in one subgroup, 0.70 in 14 subgroups and 0.20 in one subgroup, and 
so on, till 10 out of 20 subgroups have d i = 1.00. Note that maximum differences include the 
case of maximum variance, i.e., when the average d  is obtained by setting subgroup d i’s to 
one and zero.  
 Figure 1 above shows the results for population average d = 0.50. For very high 
segregation (g = 0.99), the highest proportion of cooperators (C*) is sustained when d i’s are 
                                                 
20Figure 2 shows a fitness landscape for cooperators in terms of the actual evolutionarily stable proportions C* 
for alternative levels of between-group segregation ( g ) and within-group ( d i) viscosity. In biology, fitness is 
commonly defined in terms of the expected number of offspring. In economics matters are less settled and 
fitness can be defined in terms of profits or growth (actual of expected). Using the latter definition, I refer to 
Figure 1 as a fitness landscape.
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set as low as possible. By contrast, for very low segregation (g = 0.00), the highest proportion 
of cooperators is sustained when d i’s are set as high as possible. For extreme values of 
segregation (g = 0.00 or g = 0.99) only cooperators survive (C*= 1). Some level of segregation 
(g ) between the extreme values allows some defectors to survive (C*< 1) for the same value 
of average d  (= 0.50). For example, when g = 0.20, about 85% cooperators survive 
independent of the subgroup values of d i (see Figure 1).  
 As shown in Figure 1, for average d = 0.50, increasing segregation ( g ) benefits 
cooperation when there is minimum differences in viscosity across subgroups (all d i= 0.50). 
Decreasing segregation (g ) benefits cooperation when there are maximum differences in 
viscosity across subgroups (d i’s set to 1.00 and 0.00). These conclusions do not hold for 
values of the population average d idifferent from 0.50. In the following, I describe how 
changes in levels of the population average d  alter the fitness landscape.  
 
The evolution of cooperation for low average subgroup viscosity (d < 0.50). It is possible to 
sustain an evolutionarily stable proportion of cooperators even for very low values of the 
population average d  when the level of segregation is sufficiently high. Figure 2 below shows 
the fitness landscape for average d = 0.05, i.e., one subgroup with d i= 1.00 and the nineteen 
remaining d i’s= 0.00, one subgroup with d i= 0.90 another with d i= 0.10 and the remaining 
eighteen d i’s= 0.00 etc. 
 
---------------------------- 
Figure 2 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
 The first thing to notice is that cooperation cannot be sustained for d < 1/3 when 
segregation is zero. It is necessary with 0.40 £  g   to sustain cooperation. Generally, the 
evolutionarily stable proportion of cooperators increases in g . Moreover, for very high levels 
of  g  (= 0.99), the sustainable proportion of cooperators increases as d i approach 0.50. Indeed, 
for all d < 0.50, the maximum evolutionarily stable proportion of cooperators is sustained for 
g = 0.99 and d i= 0.50 for the relevant number of subgroups (two in the present model when 
d i= 0.05). For lower levels of g  (£   0.80 when d = 0.05), the sustainable proportion of 
cooperators increases as d i approach 1.00 for the relevant number of subgroups (see Figure 
2).  
 For low values of average d , the general issue is the trade off between the protection 
of cooperators provided by high levels of segregation (high g ) and the need to reproduce new 
cooperators fast enough (high d i). For very low levels of average d  (0.05 in the present 
model), the necessary speed in replication can only be maintained when the subgroup is 
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protected against invasion by very high levels of g . In this case, the evolutionarily stable 
proportion of cooperators shrinks as g  decreases. As average d  increases from very low levels 
towards 0.50, the pressure against cooperators eases. Gradually, for every level of g , the value 
of d i that sustains the maximum level of cooperators approaches 0.50. In consequence, raising 
average d  from 0 towards 0.50 increases the smoothness of the fitness landscape but the peak 
at = 0.99 and d i= 0.50 remains). 
 
The evolution of cooperation for high average subgroup viscosity (0.50 £  d ). For high levels 
of d , the general issue is the trade off between the speed in replication of new cooperators and 
the protection of cooperators caused by high levels of segregation (high g ). Viewed from the 
perspective of defectors’, the issue is identical to the cooperator’s problem when average d  is 
low. For high levels of average d , the defector’s general problem is the trade off between the 
protection provided by high levels of segregation (high g ) and the need to reproduce new 
defectors fast enough (increases in d i). Therefore, increasing g  for high levels of d , slightly 
decreases the evolutionarily stable proportion of cooperators. Even when d  is quite high, i.e., 
average population d = 0.80 as shown in Figure 3 below, some proportion of defectors is 
sustained. 
 
---------------------------- 
Figure 3 about here 
---------------------------- 
 
 The explanation is that d = 0.80 implies d i= 0.00 in four subgroups and d i= 1.00 in 
sixteen subgroups. When the diffusion of cooperators is slowed down (by increasing g ), some 
proportion of defectors is sustained. Even if this is the case, when d  increases, the 
cooperators’ fitness surface becomes increasingly smooth and approaches 1.00. 
 
Sensitivity to initial conditions. Apart from the extreme case where g = 1.00, initial conditions 
will not influence the evolutionarily stable proportion of cooperators. In other words, initial 
differences in the mix of strategies and the number of agents in each subgroup will not 
change the stable proportions of surviving cooperators, however, the subgroup and 
population growth rates will change. Furthermore, the implications of the above conclusions 
hold for any pay-offs that respect the PD pay-off structure. The initial subgroup composition 
matters for growth, however. When average d  is low, populations with maximum initial 
differences among subgroups outgrow populations with completely mixed subgroups (for 
identical population d  and independent of g ). By contrast, high average d  in combination with 
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low g  favour populations where subgroups initially are completely mixed, however, 
uncertainty about the outcome increases in g . 
 In sum, the above analysis showed that within-group viscosity is necessary for 
cooperation to evolve whereas between-group segregation has an important role in 
influencing the level of cooperation, i.e., the stable fraction of cooperating agents. Clearly, 
within-group viscosity is the more important source of cooperation. Having said that, it was 
striking to notice that some level of cooperation could prosper even for very low average 
values of the viscosity parameter. Put differently, only one viscous subgroup was needed for 
high levels of segregation. The analyses implied that a key issue in the evolution of 
cooperation is the balance between protection and propagation of the tendency to cooperate. 
As we have seen, high levels of segregation helps protect cooperation when viscosity is low, 
however, reduces the propagation of cooperation when viscosity is high. In the following, we 
turn to this issue and consider the role of viscosity in different stages of revolution, broadly 
understood as overthrowing old ideas through cooperative efforts. 
 
 
VISCOSITY AND THE DIFFUSION OF INNOVATIONS 
 When new innovations threaten to overthrow received wisdom they are likely to be 
met by negative reactions and to be opposed by the potential losers. Therefore, development 
in the progress of technology and science includes moments of revolution. As noted by 
Mokyr (1990), technological change shocks the labour market, alters the physical 
environment, makes existing human and physical capital obsolete, and unambiguously 
reduces the producer’s surplus of the innovator’s competitors. As further indicated by Mokyr 
(1990), resistance to innovation is a common phenomenon including historical examples such 
as the prolonged resistance to new technology in the textile trade, the edict which in 1299 
banned the use of Arabic numbers by Florentine bankers and the delayed introduction of 
printing into Paris caused by resistance from the scribes guild.  
 Comparable resistance to scientific change has been observed in economics, as 
beautifully illustrated by Shackle (1967), in biology (see e.g. Mayr, 1982) and undoubtedly 
most other disciplines. Historical examples include the declaration of Mandeville’s 1723 
edition of the Fable of the Bees as a public nuisance by the Grand Jury of Middlesex and the 
subsequent assail on his work by eminent contemporary writers (Torrance, 1998). More 
recent examples include the rejection of Darwinian theory as unscientific and its long period 
of eclipse (Cronin, 1991), the reluctance in mainstream economics to renounce the 
assumption of perfect competition and, subsequently, to consider process and learning 
(Shackle, 1967). 
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 Since the distribution of benefits flowing from new ideas probably can be 
characterised by a low average and a high variance, some resistance is clearly apposite. In 
numerous situations new ideas are clear improvements, however; at least viewed from the 
perspective of society. Since an invention in its early phases threaten the private interests of 
the potential losers, its propagation often depends on the protection of the inventor from those 
who stand to benefit from the suppression of the invention (Mokyr, 1990). In other words, 
there is a conflict between those who oppose the invention and the cooperating 
revolutionaries who aim to propagate it. 
 As the above analyses have shown, the general issue in such situations is the trade off 
between the protection of cooperators provided by high levels of segregation (high g ) and 
propagation in terms of the need to reproduce new cooperators fast enough (high d i).  
 The trade-off is well known to planners of political revolutions. Cooperating 
comrades are organised in cells and the segregation between cells needs to be high enough to 
protect against invasion of subversive elements. Moreover, the rate of conversion of 
newcomers to the cause (pay-offs in our model) depends on the probability of interacting 
with other genuine proponents of the cause. Seasoned members should meet each other more 
frequently than they meet newcomers and the segregation between cells should be high. Early 
phases of successful revolutions seem to have these characteristics. 
 As the above model illustrates, the problem in early phases of political, technological 
or scientific revolutions are to strike a proper balance between interacting with like-minded 
people and running the risk of betrayal or losing faith by meeting new prospects. In later 
phases of revolution, when the faithful are plenty and their presence clustered within a local 
population, the cause will prosper by decreasing segregation. Similar considerations can be 
associated with the evolution of cooperation in other structured populations such as research 
teams within interacting universities, strategic groups within interacting industries and rock 
musicians playing in alternative ”interacting” bands. In all these cases, changes in structural 
dynamics will influence the protection and propagation of cooperation. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 Clearly, the trade-off between protection and propagation implied by the above 
analysis points to the importance of obtaining a better understanding of the structural 
dynamics of cooperation. First, the simulation showed that a high level of segregation 
between subgroups always benefits the weaker strategy. Thus segregation between subgroups 
may actually compensate for clustering within each subgroup but the results cut both ways 
with respect to the possibility of sustaining costly cooperation. A high level of segregation 
helps sustain some level of cooperation where it would otherwise have vanished but also 
helps sustain defection in situations where it would otherwise vanish. Second, segregation 
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can sustain some level of cooperation for average levels of viscosity that are much lower than 
the level of viscosity needed to sustain some level of cooperation in the case of single groups. 
Third, for low average levels of viscosity, a high level of between-group segregation protects 
cooperation but for high levels of average viscosity, reducing segregation will propagate 
cooperation. The reverse conclusion applies to defection. 
 Successfully overthrowing existing wisdom is facilitated by particular structural 
conditions that need adjustment as support is gained. The above model suggests how the 
general trade-off between protection and propagation may be balanced. It also complements 
existing research on viscous equilibria by introducing a multi-level selection environment, 
however, to maintain focus, the model ignores the issue of how structural dynamics interacts 
with differences in information processing power across agents.  
 DeCanio and Watkins (1998) have addressed this issue in a simulation study where 
the agent’s information processing capacity was represented by a (logistic-type) function 
such that the probability of accepting an innovation was very low unless a substantial fraction 
of his nearest neighbours had accepted the innovation. For some ranges of agents’ 
information processing powers, DeCanio and Watkins’ (1998) show that the speed of 
adopting new innovations can be increased when the number of connections is decreased, i.e., 
when the organisation is broken up into teams. Moreover, Amann & Yang (1994) in a formal 
analysis of the PD-game show that information allows some proportion of cooperators to 
prosper. This suggests that a natural and promising path for further research of the structural 
dynamics of continuity and change proceed along a combined consideration of cognitive 
friction (in terms of within-group viscosity and between group segregation) and the agents’ 
information processing power.  
 It should also be mentioned that prior research on multi-level selection reported in 
Sober & Wilson (1998), to some extent, is challenged but also supported by the above results. 
Sober & Wilson (1998) claim that the significance of relatedness for the evolution of altruism 
is to increase genetic variation among subgroups and thereby increasing the importance of 
group selection. As indicated in the above, this claim relies on a specific interpretation of 
Hamilton’s (1975) argument. It is viscosity, which allows cooperation to evolve, both for 
Hamilton (1975) and in the model analysed in the present work. Although between-group 
segregation can influence the level of cooperation, it can never sustain cooperation in the 
absence of viscosity. Here it should be noted that the above analyses excluded the possibility 
of empty subgroups and thus a dynamics that includes the birth and death of subgroups. If 
this possibility is included, the conclusion may or may not be reversed depending on the 
definition of the transition probabilities, which determine in which order and at what rate 
cooperators and defectors arrive at empty subgroups. It should further be noted that since 
segregation between subgroups may actually compensate for clustering within subgroups, the 
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simulation lends support to Sober & Wilson’s (1998) claim that group selection and 
individual selection are best seen as distinct causes that may interact to sustain costly 
cooperation.    
 Concerning the general issue of altruism versus egoism, we reach similar conclusions 
as prior research. In a local interaction model where players choose strategies by imitating 
successful players, Eshel et al. (1998) showed that altruists need protection to survive. 
Protection is provided by local interaction patterns that allow groups of altruists to share the 
net cost of altruism, however, mutant egoists or defectors can always invade altruists or 
cooperators. In Eshel et al.’s (1998) model, the limit to expansion of egoism is the fall in pay-
off to egoism, which at some point leads imitators to become altruists. Even if Eshel et al.’s 
(1998) model is different from the one studied in the above, it shares its central feature; 
cooperation cannot survive in a completely unstructured (fluid) population. By contrast, when 
factors such as spatial or genetic clustering introduce constrained non-random interaction 
patterns, it is possible for some proportion of cooperators or altruists to survive. As in Eshel 
et al. (1998) and Amann & Yang (1998), this result does not rely on reciprocity.  
 In sum, the simple model analysed in the present work, showed how the combined 
effect of viscosity within multiple subgroups and segregation, defined as limits in the 
migration of members between these, influence the evolution of cooperation. In particular, 
the model showed that segregation (slow migration between subgroups) is important because 
it helps to sustain the weaker strategy. The present work has assumed that within-group 
viscosity existed in biological and social populations. This is obviously an empirical 
question. Nevertheless, it would be interesting to identify the dynamics, which could 
”produce” viscosity as an outcome of an evolutionary process. The above results suggest that 
we should look for a dynamics, which combine slow migration with the possibility of 
persistent subgroup heterogeneity. This suggests that a sufficiently large delay in replication 
caused by migration (a transient fitness reduction) may be enough to produce the positive 
correlation between subgroups,  which can be interpreted as an expression of viscosity. At 
least this seems plausible for a model with a very low migration rate.  
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Figure 1: Stable proportions of C* for alternative values of g  and average d  = (1/20 S d i) 
= 0.50 (0.50 £   d i £ 1.00). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Stable proportions of C* for alternative values of g  and average d  = (1/20 S d i) 
= 0.05 (0.30 £   d i £  1.00). 
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Figure 3: Stable proportions of C* for alternative values of g  and average d  = (1/20 S d i) 
= 0.80 (0.80 £   d i £ 1.00)) 
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TABLE 1a: Illustrative pay offs 
 C D 
C 3,3 0,5 
D 5,0 1,1 
 
TABLE 1b Adjusted pay offs
 C D 
C 3,3 3d i, 5-4 d i 
D 5-4 d i, 3 d i 1,1 
 
TABLE 1c Normalised adjusted pay offs
 C D 
C 4d i-2, 4 d i-2 0, 0 
D 0, 0 1-3 d i, 1-3 d i  
 
